Thursday, April 29, 2010
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Monday, April 26, 2010
Meeting 4/26 Notes
It was decided that Patrick and Nate will do the presentation.
Patrick will present Introduction&Background along with experiments: sections 1-3, 8
Nate will cover the game description and belief update methods: sections 4,5,6
We pooled our raw slides. Next meeting is on Wednesday at 2pm. Nate & Patrick will deliver mock presentation.
I'm not entirely sure how the discussion should be presented, or if it should...
Patrick will present Introduction&Background along with experiments: sections 1-3, 8
Nate will cover the game description and belief update methods: sections 4,5,6
We pooled our raw slides. Next meeting is on Wednesday at 2pm. Nate & Patrick will deliver mock presentation.
I'm not entirely sure how the discussion should be presented, or if it should...
Wednesday 4/21 Meeting Notes
Meeting Notes:
We began with some discussions on notations within the paper:
i) theta seemed a bit abused as theta_j is the REAL probability of seller j being honest
ii) The purpose of mu was confusing
We all agreed to read sections 4,5,6 closely to break down any confusion.
After some discussion we divided slide development in the following way:
Joo: Section 5 & 6, Belief update
Guan: Section 8, Experiments & Results
Patrick: Section 1-3, Introduction & Background
Mehmet: Section 4, Bayesian game
Nate: Organization & Discussion
Presenters would be decided at the next meeting on Monday 4/26
We began with some discussions on notations within the paper:
i) theta seemed a bit abused as theta_j is the REAL probability of seller j being honest
ii) The purpose of mu was confusing
We all agreed to read sections 4,5,6 closely to break down any confusion.
After some discussion we divided slide development in the following way:
Joo: Section 5 & 6, Belief update
Guan: Section 8, Experiments & Results
Patrick: Section 1-3, Introduction & Background
Mehmet: Section 4, Bayesian game
Nate: Organization & Discussion
Presenters would be decided at the next meeting on Monday 4/26
Slides for 5&6
This is my slides for chapter 5 and 6. It has 9 slides in it.
https://docs.google.com/present/edit?id=0AUW7NfMTKBufZGQ1NDhqdDJfMTNjZDQzMjRnbQ&hl=en
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Some points in section 4
Hi all,
As we talked on wednesday there are some points might be mentioned at discussion section or the assumptions. The first assumtion is that the online nature of the merket is assumed to be eBay-like. The stage games are assumed to be Bayesian games with assymetric information. I do not know if it is enough just to state that assymetric info means a player has more info than the other. One more thing is that perfect bayesian equilibrium thing we discussed on wednesday.
and at the stage game it is assumed that each seller acts as a honest merchant in a fraction of transactions. And at page 6's second paragraph, a term is used like Byeasian decision theory, but this is, I think , like perfact Bayesian Game should be included in a seperate section.
Lastly, there is a subtle point I did not understand. the a and B factors are taken into consideration only when the seller thinks that he is selling a lemon. But, even when the seller thinks that he is delivering the correct item, the buyer still can argue that it is not actually so. I mean when B (beta) is 1, the a (alpha) might still be say 0.5. but there is not such a state in the tree. since the author himself is saying that this a and B are subjective estimate, it is perfectly ok to expect this scenerio I think.
that is all from my section, I know most of them does not worth to be taken in discussion section, but I wanted to post them though.
As we talked on wednesday there are some points might be mentioned at discussion section or the assumptions. The first assumtion is that the online nature of the merket is assumed to be eBay-like. The stage games are assumed to be Bayesian games with assymetric information. I do not know if it is enough just to state that assymetric info means a player has more info than the other. One more thing is that perfect bayesian equilibrium thing we discussed on wednesday.
and at the stage game it is assumed that each seller acts as a honest merchant in a fraction of transactions. And at page 6's second paragraph, a term is used like Byeasian decision theory, but this is, I think , like perfact Bayesian Game should be included in a seperate section.
Lastly, there is a subtle point I did not understand. the a and B factors are taken into consideration only when the seller thinks that he is selling a lemon. But, even when the seller thinks that he is delivering the correct item, the buyer still can argue that it is not actually so. I mean when B (beta) is 1, the a (alpha) might still be say 0.5. but there is not such a state in the tree. since the author himself is saying that this a and B are subjective estimate, it is perfectly ok to expect this scenerio I think.
that is all from my section, I know most of them does not worth to be taken in discussion section, but I wanted to post them though.
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